Future of Jewish demographics — 90% of Jews will reside in Israel in 2100

30 min readDec 17, 2024

Demographic trends — encompassing population growth, age distribution, and migration — are critical for understanding and predicting economic, social, and political developments. My interests at the intersection of history and technology fuel my drive to refine these predictions and contribute to informed, data-driven decision-making.

This article brings together these passions to examine the future of the Jewish people over the next 130 years. I will outline my methodology, assumptions, and calculations (with the support of ChatGPT) to project Jewish populations by country for the years 2050, 2100, and 2150.

Specifically, we will analyze how factors such as low birth rates, an aging population, and significant rates of intermarriage among Jews outside Israel shape realistic demographic trends. When combined with Israel’s relatively high birth rates, these dynamics point to a striking projection: by 2100, approximately 90% of the global Jewish population may reside in Israel.

Additionally, we will explore the unique demographic trends of the Jewish Ultra-Orthodox community and address more speculative factors, such as immigration and emigration patterns within Jewish communities worldwide.

This article is intended to remain politically neutral, offering insights and tools to policymakers, researchers, and other stakeholders to develop their own visions and strategies based on a shared, evidence-based foundation.

Introduction

Map-based predictions

Defining Generational Time Frames

Let’s define these time periods as follows:

Generations

2025–2050: 1 generation from today

2050–2100: 3 generations from today

2100–2150: 5 generations from today

A generation typically spans 30 years, as most adults have children by this age. For simplicity, I assume a shorter 25-year generational length. While this slight adjustment may vary timing, it does not significantly affect the overall conclusions.

Defining Jewish Population

To predict Jewish people’s future, we need to define what we mean by the “Jewish population.” Here, we will focus on what is commonly referred to as the “core” Jewish population — individuals who self-identify as Jewish.

There are three competing definitions for identifying Jews:

Religious Definition: According to Jewish Law (the “Halacha”), a Jew is recursively defined as an individual born to a Jewish mother. However, this definition includes individuals who may not self-identify as Jewish due to their predominantly non-Jewish upbringing. For example, someone with only one Jewish grandparent (through their mother) may not view themselves as Jewish, despite qualifying under halachic rules.
The Core Definition: This definition considers as Jewish those who exclusively self-identify as Jewish.
The Extended Definition: This broader definition includes anyone who partially identifies as Jewish or has a relative who is Jewish.

The core definition is the most effective for analyzing future trends, as it closely aligns with the likelihood of maintaining and transmitting Jewish cultural and religious identity. Indeed, the Jewish Policy Research (JPR) report found that nearly all children of in-married Jewish couples are raised as Jews, whereas only about a third of children from intermarried couples are raised as Jewish. Additionally, the Pew Research Center’s 2013 survey indicated that children of intermarriage are more likely to identify religiously as atheist, agnostic, or ‘nothing in particular’ compared to those with two Jewish parents. Studies — primarily conducted in the United States but applicable to the Diaspora — indicate that individuals within the “core” definition are more likely to maintain Jewish identity and pass it on to future generations.

By contrast, the extended definition includes individuals with distant Jewish ancestry who often lack strong Jewish identification. The Pew Research Center’s 2013 survey found that among Jews of no religion — many of whom solely have a Jewish father — 79% are intermarried, compared to 36% among Jews by religion. This weakens the reliability of the extended definition for predicting demographic continuity.

The halachic definition, while significant religiously, can be limiting when analyzing demographic trends. It includes individuals who may not self-identify as Jewish due to their predominantly non-Jewish upbringing. Conversely, an individual with a Jewish father who self-identifies as Jewish — though not recognized as Jewish by Jewish Law — has a strong likelihood of marrying a Jewish partner and maintaining Jewish identity. Studies indicate that individuals who actively identify as Jewish are more inclined to seek a Jewish partner, which helps to preserve cultural continuity.

Therefore, the core definition is preferred because it focuses on individuals who actively identify as Jewish and are more likely to preserve and transmit Jewish identity. It provides a clear and reliable predictor of the growth and preservation of the Jewish population.

PART 1— The situation in 2025

Let’s start with today’s 14.7 million “core” Jewish population, broken down by the main countries:

We can observe that only nine countries have a Jewish population exceeding 100,000 individuals, and these nine countries comprise about 90% of the current global Jewish population. Additionally, 80% of global Jews reside in either Israel or the United States.

A Brief Historical Overview

The formation of the ancient kingdoms of Israel and Judah began around 1000 BCE. While recounting their full history would require a book, in simple terms, the period saw a shift from regional polytheism to monotheism, eventually giving rise to modern Judaism.

The Kingdom of Israel (c. 930 BCE — 722 BCE) and later Judah (c. 930 BCE — 586 BCE) were often in conflict, though occasionally united. Both were ultimately invaded by the Babylonian Empire in 586 BCE, which deported the Jewish elite to Babylon (modern-day Baghdad) for over 70 years. During this period, the Jewish population in Babylon is estimated to have been around 10,000 to 20,000. Later, the Persian Empire, under Cyrus II, conquered Babylon in 539 BCE and allowed the Jews to return to their homeland, where they rebuilt the Temple destroyed by the Babylonians (completed in 516 BCE). Some Jews returned, while others remained in Babylon, forming the oldest diaspora community, which spread across the region, including in what is now Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.

Next, the Greek Empire, led by Alexander the Great, conquered the region in 332 BCE, and some Jews migrated throughout the empire for economic opportunities, including to what is now Greece. By this time, the Jewish population in Judea was estimated to be around 150,000. Following a period of political and economic instability, the Roman Empire invaded in 63 BCE, leading to two major Jewish revolts: the First Jewish-Roman War (66–73 CE) and the Bar Kokhba Revolt (132–135 CE), both of which were quashed. These conflicts and earlier periods of instability resulted in a significant exodus of Jews across the Roman Empire — some as slaves and others seeking better opportunities in regions like modern-day Egypt, Libya, Tunisia (Carthage), and Italy. By 135 CE, the Jewish population in Judea had significantly decreased due to war and exile.

Jews eventually settled in Ashkenaz (along the present-day French-German border) and Al-Andalus (Muslim-ruled Spain). By the 10th to 12th centuries, rising hostility and expulsion edicts forced Ashkenazi Jews to flee Western Europe and seek refuge in the more welcoming Polish Empire. By the 13th century, the Jewish population in Poland was estimated to be around 30,000. Similarly, Sephardic Jews faced increasing persecution under Muslim rule and after the Catholic Reconquista (completed in 1492), prompting many to flee to Morocco, Algeria, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The Jewish population in Spain before the expulsion was approximately 200,000.

In the late 1700s, the Russian Empire’s expansion into Eastern Europe severely restricted Jewish life, confining Jews to shtetls and forcing them into poverty. At this time, the Jewish population in the Russian Empire was estimated to be over one million — mimicking the significant overall population growth in the region. Meanwhile, Jews in Western Europe began gaining full citizenship, with France being the first to grant it in 1791.

Pogroms, lack of integration, and rising hostility led to the emergence of modern Zionism in the late 19th century. Early waves of Aliyah (Jewish immigration to Israel) began in the 1880s, with Jews from Eastern Europe moving to Ottoman-controlled Palestine. By 1914, the Jewish population in Palestine had grown to approximately 85,000. Approximately 2.5 million Russian Jews fled to the United States, 200,000 to Argentina, 20,000 to Australia, 150,000 to Canada, 100,000 to Western Europe, and a smaller number to the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine). German Jews fleeing Nazi persecution in the 1930s migrated to the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Palestine (then under British rule).

The Holocaust (1941–1945) led to the extermination of six million European Jews. Before the Holocaust, the Jewish population in Europe was around nine million. Survivors moved to the newly formed State of Israel (established in 1948), were trapped behind the Soviet Iron Curtain, or remained in France and the United Kingdom. Following Israel’s establishment, nearly all Jews from the Middle East were expelled, with most fleeing to Israel and some to the United Kingdom, effectively ending the 2,500-year-old Jewish presence in Babylon. By 1950, Israel’s Jewish population had grown to approximately 1.2 million.

When Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s, many Jews relocated to France, their former colonial ruler, making France a significant Jewish center, with its Jewish population reaching around 500,000 by the 1970s. Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, approximately 1.1 million Jews emigrated from Russia to Israel, significantly boosting Israel’s Jewish population.

Throughout history including recent times, Jews from smaller communities around the world have either moved to Israel or sought opportunities in wealthier nations. As is common worldwide, some Israelis have also moved abroad in search of better economic prospects.

Part 2 — Effect of Current Birth Rates and Assimilation Rates on Future demographics

The first calculation we will make will take into account only two factors: current birth rates and assimilation rates. We are making several assumptions here:

In Western countries (excluding Israel), the Jewish birth rate closely mirrors the “White/Native” birth rate, as opposed to the often higher birth rate seen among first-generation immigrants. These birth rates are often below, or significantly below, the replacement level.
50% of Jewish children from intermarried couples will assimilate, meaning they will either not consider themselves Jewish or not marry a Jewish partner, leading to their children being considered assimilated. This is a conservative assumption given previous studies noting that 79% of Jews of no religion intermarry, but we will adhere to this estimate for our analysis.
5% of Jewish children with two Jewish parents will also assimilate, meaning they will not identify as Jewish in any capacity.
In Western countries, we assume stable birth rates over the next 100 years. These rates may continue to decline or slightly increase due to population adjustments, but assuming stability provides a balanced perspective.
In Israel, the Jewish birth rate is expected to gradually converge to replacement level over time, although it currently is significantly higher.

Note that there are no specific assumptions regarding the Haredi population at this stage; they will be taken into consideration in subsequent analyses.

The key variables used in our calculations are as follows:

Current Jewish Population (P₀): The initial population used as the basis for projections.
Total Fertility Rate (TFR): The average number of children born to a woman over her lifetime.
Intermarriage Rate (IMR): The proportion of Jews marrying non-Jews.
Assimilation Rates (AR): The percentage of individuals who do not maintain a Jewish identity.

Net Reproduction Rate (NRR):

NRR = (TFR × (1 − IMR) × (1 − AR_full)) + (TFR × IMR × (1 − AR_inter)), which takes into account both birth rates and assimilation rates.

Thus, for each generation: P_next = P_current × NRR

The resulting projections are as follows:

Notice that the Israeli population — with its high birth rate and negligible assimilation rate — will significantly increase this century, even assuming a declining birth rate compared to today. By 2100, Israel’s Jewish population is projected to double from 6.8 million in 2020 to 13.5 million, reflecting its continued demographic strength.

On the other hand, other countries will inevitably see their Jewish populations decrease due to lower birth rates and high assimilation rates. For example, the United States’ Jewish population is projected to decline from 5.7 million in 2020 to approximately 1.5 million by 2100, illustrating the impact of low birth rates compounded by assimilation.

The assumed birth rates for the White populations of these countries are as follows:

United States: Approximately 1.7 children per woman, which is below the replacement level of 2.1. The intermarriage rate in the United States is estimated to be around 58% — 71% excluding Ultra Orthodox Jews — contributing to a higher assimilation rate and population decline.
France: Around 1.8 children per woman, which, while slightly higher, is still insufficient to maintain population levels. The intermarriage rate in France is approximately 40%.
Israel: In contrast, Israel’s Jewish population has a significantly higher birth rate of approximately 3.0 children per woman, and intermarriage is negligible, which contributes to the projected population growth.

As a result, the low birth rates combined with high assimilation contribute to the significant projected decline in the Jewish populations of these countries.

Part 3— Effect of the Haredi Birth Rate

The Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox Jewish) community demonstrates significantly different demographic trends compared to other Jewish populations. Specifically, Haredim have notably higher birth rates and lower assimilation rates, which are driven by their distinct cultural and religious practices. According to data from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Haredi families average 6.6 children per family, compared to 2.8 children among the general Jewish population. The strong centrality of religion within Haredi communities also results in a much lower assimilation rate compared to other Jewish subgroups.

Haredi Population and Demographic Trends

Currently, Haredim comprise approximately 13% of the Jewish population in Israel. In the United States, estimates suggest that Haredim make up about 10% of the total Jewish population, in line with the main Diasporic countries except Russia. These proportions underscore the growing influence of the Haredi sector within global Jewish communities, largely driven by their high birth rates and cultural practices that limit assimilation.

Distinct Categorization of Haredim

In Israel, the Jewish population is categorized into several groups based on levels of religious observance:

Hiloni (Secular): Approximately 45% of Israeli Jews identify as Hiloni, meaning they are secular and do not strictly observe religious practices. Secular Jews identify culturally with Judaism but do not actively practice religious observances.
Masorti (Traditional): About 25% consider themselves Masorti, blending traditional Jewish practices with modern lifestyles. Traditional Jews maintain some religious practices but are not strictly observant.
Dati (Religious): Roughly 16% are Dati, adhering more rigorously to Jewish laws and customs. Religious Jews, also known as Orthodox (excluding Haredim), follow Jewish laws more strictly while engaging extensively with broader society.
Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox): The remaining 14% are Haredi, maintaining strict religious observance and often living in insular communities.

In the United States, Jewish denominational affiliations are distributed as follows:

Reform Judaism: Approximately 35% of American Jews identify with the Reform movement, which emphasizes individual autonomy in interpreting Jewish traditions.
Conservative Judaism: About 18% align with Conservative Judaism, balancing traditional Jewish laws with modernity.
Modern Orthodox Judaism: Modern Orthodox Jews represent a portion of the Orthodox community, adhering to Jewish laws while actively engaging with secular society, including higher education and professional careers.
Orthodox Judaism: Roughly 10% are Orthodox, strictly adhering to traditional Jewish laws and customs.
Other Denominations: The remaining percentage includes those affiliated with smaller movements or who identify as “Just Jewish” without specific denominational ties.

While there are nuanced distinctions among Jewish groups ranging from secular to Ultra-Orthodox, we assume that the movement between secular, traditional, Modern Orthodox, and religious Jews is fluid enough to justify averaging these groups for future projections. However, the Haredim are distinct enough, in terms of lifestyle and demographic behavior, to be treated as a separate category.

Community Dynamics and Integration

Haredim are more likely to maintain their traditional lifestyles within communities that are relatively isolated from mainstream society. In Israel, this isolation is facilitated by the presence of established Haredi communities and subsidized support for their religious lifestyle. In contrast, in countries like the United States or parts of Europe, many Haredim may need to interact more extensively with mainstream society, including entering the workforce, to support their growing families.

There is also a growing demand within Israel for greater integration of Haredim into mainstream society, and this trend is expected to continue. This integration may not necessarily change Haredi beliefs, but it could lead to changes in their birth and assimilation rates as their community becomes more involved in broader social and economic structures.

In smaller Haredi communities, maintaining religious isolation is more feasible, as the broader Jewish population can often provide adequate support for religious needs such as synagogues, kosher stores, and charity infrastructure. However, as the share of Haredim grows, the broader Jewish community may find it increasingly difficult to provide these resources, requiring more Haredim to participate in mainstream work environments to support their lifestyle. A similar challenge exists in Israel, where the growing Haredi population will put increased pressure on public finances.

Assumptions for Future Projections

Several assumptions are made to project future trends:

Assimilation and Birth Rates: As the share of Haredim increases within a Jewish community, overall assimilation rates are likely to decline, while birth rates are likely to rise. The Haredi community has an extremely low intermarriage rate, often below 5%, due to strong social and religious norms that discourage marrying outside the community. Studies from the Pew Research Center and the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) have documented these trends, showing that intermarriage rates among Haredim remain exceptionally low.
Declining Birth Rates: In line with trends observed in Israel and the United States over the past 30 years, the Haredi birth rate is projected to decline by approximately one point per decade until it converges with the broader Jewish population’s birth rate. For instance, the birth rate among Israeli Haredi dropped from 7.5 children per woman in the 1990s to 6.6 today. A similar trend has been observed among Haredim in the United States, where the birth rate has gradually declined from 6.5 in the 1990s to 5.8 today. These declines are partly attributed to increasing economic pressures and greater integration into broader society. Sources such as the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics and sociological studies by the JPPI confirm this gradual decline in fertility rates.
Attrition Rates: The rate at which individuals leave the Haredi community (referred to as attrition) is also expected to change over time. In Israel, it is estimated that approximately 10% of each age cohort leaves the Haredi community, often driven by economic challenges or the need for greater integration. It is assumed that this attrition rate will increase by 10 percentage points every 15 years until it reaches a peak of 80%. This peak represents a level where only those capable of sustaining religious isolation while managing community needs (such as kosher certification and religious education) would remain.

For Haredi communities outside of Israel, where state-sponsored assistance is often lacking and maintaining isolation is more challenging, attrition is assumed to increase by 10 percentage points every five years until reaching a peak of 90%. This is based on the need to maintain a sustainable balance between community growth and economic contribution. Studies from the Pew Research Center and other institutions suggest that attrition rates among Orthodox communities in the United States and the United Kingdom have been increasing, with an estimated 17% of individuals raised in Orthodox households leaving the community.

Inflow into Haredi Communities: It is also assumed that 3% of Jews will become Haredi in each generation. Although detailed studies on this trend are limited, evidence suggests a gradual shift, with some non-Haredi Jews choosing to join Haredi communities for spiritual fulfillment or a desire for a more observant lifestyle. Studies conducted by the JPPI and anecdotal evidence indicate that this small but steady inflow contributes to the overall growth of the Haredi population.

Demographic Calculations

The projected Net Reproduction Rate (NRR) for Haredim and the overall Jewish population can be calculated using the following approach:

Haredi Net Reproduction Rate (NRR_Haredi): NRR_Haredi = 2 × TFR × (1 − Attrition Rate)
Where TFR is the Total Fertility Rate.
Overall Jewish Net Reproduction Rate (NRR): NRR_Haredi * <Share of Haredim> + NRR_Non-Haredi * <1-Share of Haredim>

This formula sums the contributions of both Haredi and non-Haredi populations to determine the overall Jewish NRR.

These calculations allow for a nuanced understanding of how the growing Haredi community will shape Jewish demographics in different countries, taking into account changes in birth rates, attrition, and integration dynamics.

Even with our assumptions, by 2050, Israel’s Haredi population share amongst Jews is estimated at 24.85%, and this is expected to rise to 33.77% by 2100. For other Jewish communities abroad, while the overall population decline is more contained than previously assumed, the Haredi share will still grow significantly.

For example, in the United States, the Haredi share will increase to 32.69% in 2050 and maintain itself around 30% by 2100, helping to sustain the community. France and the United Kingdom are expected to see Haredi shares rise to 36.00% by 2100. Meanwhile, Jewish communities like Russia’s, which currently has a minimal Haredi population share of 5.00% in 2050, are likely to almost collapse by the end of the century, with a projected population of just 33,413 and an essentially negligible Haredi share.

Overall, while many countries will experience a significant reduction in their Jewish populations, the growing proportion of Haredim will play a critical role in sustaining community numbers globally, especially in the United States and parts of Europe.

Under these assumptions, the Haredi population in many countries will peak around 2100 before experiencing a gradual decline, which will lead to slower population growth in Israel and a further decrease in Jewish population across Diaspora communities.

For instance, Israel’s population is projected to grow from 6,800,000 in 2020 to 13,590,738 by 2100, with the Haredi share increasing from 26.56% in 2050 to 35.10% in 2100, before dropping to 30.20% by 2150. This slowdown in Haredi growth will cause the overall growth rate to decelerate.

In summary, under these assumptions, while the Haredi population would peak around 2100 in most Jewish communities, it will then start to decline as a result of their growing convergence with mainstream Jewish communities, except for a core group. This trend will contribute to population deceleration in Israel and cause further decreases in the Jewish populations of Diaspora communities.

Part 4— The Effect of Age Distribution

In addition to birth rates and assimilation rates, understanding the age distribution within the Jewish population is crucial for making accurate population forecasts. Specifically, the age structure can either accelerate growth or contribute to decline, depending on how many individuals are within the reproductive age range.

Consider a hypothetical Jewish population of 20 individuals, where 10 are women, each with an average birth rate of 3 children. If all of these women are currently between 20 and 40 years old, we would expect to see substantial population growth: these 10 couples (20 individuals) could give rise to 30 children in the next generation. However, if only 2 of these women are of reproductive age, while the other 8 are significantly older, the demographic outlook changes. In this scenario, over one generation, the population would experience a decline — starting with 20 individuals, losing 16 elderly due to natural mortality, and adding only 6 new children, resulting in a smaller population.

This example illustrates why the age structure, often visualized through an age pyramid, matters significantly in population studies. A young age pyramid can lead to rapid population growth, while an older one may signal an impending decline.

Israel has a notably young age distribution compared to Jewish communities in the Diaspora, particularly among non-Haredi populations. For instance, around 50% of women in Israel are under 40 years old, compared to only 30% of women in the Diaspora. This difference has substantial implications for population growth potential.

To quantify the impact of age distribution on population growth, we use an adjustment to the total fertility rate (TFR) known as the Effective Fertility Rate (EFR). The EFR is calculated using the formula below.

The standard proportion of women under 40 refers to the expected percentage of women who are in their reproductive years, typically assumed to be around 40–50% in a young population. This assumed number provides a baseline for comparing different populations and assessing how age distribution impacts birth rates.

EFR = TFR × (Standard Proportion / Proportion of Women Under 40)

This formula takes into account the proportion of women within the reproductive age range, effectively reducing the expected reproduction rate when there is a lower proportion of young women. In this way, the EFR provides a more realistic measure of population growth by accounting for the effect of an aging population on birth rates.

Changes in Population Projections with Age Distribution Considered

The updated population projections, incorporating the impact of age distribution, reveal significant differences from previous forecasts. The adjustments show that the proportion of women of reproductive age has a major influence on the growth trajectories of different Jewish communities.

For Israel, the Jewish 2050 population projection has increased from 9,655,456 to 9,880,672, with a corresponding increase in the Haredi share from 24.85% to 26.56%. By the year 2100, the population is projected to be 13,590,738 instead of 13,282,158. This increase reflects Israel’s favorable age distribution, which supports accelerated growth compared to initial estimates. The young age structure in Israel significantly enhances the population outlook, making it even more optimistic when the age distribution factor is considered.

In contrast, the impact of age distribution on Diaspora communities, such as the United States, is less favorable. The 2050 population projection for the United States drops from 3,819,707 to 3,534,057, and the Haredi share increases from 32.69% to 36.65%. By 2100, the population is expected to decline further, with a projection of 1,575,326 compared to the previous estimate of 1,820,590. This reflects the relatively older age structure within the Diaspora, which limits growth potential and results in a more conservative population forecast.

These revised projections underscore the critical importance of age distribution in determining the future population of Jewish communities. Countries with younger populations, such as Israel, are likely to experience continued growth, even at an accelerated rate when the age factor is considered. In contrast, communities in the Diaspora, where the population is aging, face a greater challenge in sustaining population growth over the long term.

The age distribution factor, therefore, provides a more nuanced understanding of population trends, highlighting the need for targeted strategies to support growth in communities where the age pyramid skews older. These insights are crucial for policymakers and community leaders as they plan for the future of Jewish populations globally.

A note on American Jewry

In this section, we will specifically address the possible counter-argument that American Jewry is not in decline, but instead is experiencing growth, and explain why this view does not contradict our previous prediction of significant decline in American Jewry.

The argument that the Jewish population in the United States has been growing steadily and could continue to do so often stems from a misinterpretation of statistical data. The frequently cited estimate of 7.5 million Jews in the U.S. includes all individuals who identify as Jewish in some capacity, including children of mixed marriages who may not be raised in a predominantly Jewish cultural or religious environment. This broad definition inflates the numbers, but does not necessarily indicate a stable or expanding Jewish identity across generations. The reality is that many of these individuals have a tenuous connection to Jewish life, which does not ensure continuity over time.

Moreover, while the current statistics may show a substantial Jewish population, they also reveal that this population is disproportionately elderly. Many American Jews belong to an older generation that benefited from higher birth rates in previous decades and enjoys a longer life expectancy. However, as this large cohort passes away, we are likely to witness a significant drop in the overall Jewish population. The demographic impact of this shift should not be underestimated, as it will lead to a sudden decrease that is not easily replenished by younger generations.

In addition, an increasing proportion of young Jews in the U.S. describe themselves as having “no religion” or as being “culturally diverse.” This trend indicates that many young individuals who identify as Jewish do so only partially, or in a cultural rather than a religious or communal sense. As previously discussed, individuals of mixed heritage are statistically more likely to assimilate within one generation. Consequently, this trend of partial identification is unlikely to sustain a robust Jewish population over time. The weakening of a cohesive Jewish identity suggests that fewer young people will maintain strong connections to Judaism, further accelerating the decline.

These dynamics also help explain the decreasing interest in and connection with Israel among younger American Jews. For many of them, Jewish identity has shifted from being a singular, cohesive affiliation to becoming one of multiple identities within the broader American multicultural landscape. Such a diluted identity is more vulnerable to being lost within a generation, especially in the absence of significant cultural or religious reinforcement.

It is essential to emphasize that these patterns are not unique to American Jewry; similar trends are evident across other major Diaspora communities. Declining birth rates and consistent rates of assimilation mirror the demographic realities of their host countries. While some subgroups, such as the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) communities, maintain higher birth rates, which may give the appearance of stability or even growth, the overall trend for the larger non-Haredi population is one of gradual decline. Even if nominal growth occurs, these communities face significant long-term challenges to their sustainability and continuity.

In stark contrast, Israel stands out with its high birth rate and near-zero rate of assimilation. This combination positions Israel’s Jewish population for significant growth over the coming century. It is projected that by the end of this century, approximately 90% of the world’s Jews will reside in Israel. This projection is based solely on natural population growth and does not take into account immigration, which could further enhance ( or decrease ) Israel’s population. Additionally, potential future trends involving Israelis establishing or invigorating communities abroad could reshape the current dynamics of the Jewish Diaspora, which will be explored in subsequent sections.

Part 5— Economic Migration Trends

Migration trends within Jewish communities have often been driven by two primary factors: economic opportunities and the need to escape hardship or insecurity. Throughout history, these motivations have shaped both immigration to Israel and movements within the Jewish diaspora. In this section, we explore these migration patterns, focusing particularly on the economic aspects that have influenced Jewish mobility.

Defining “Aliyah” and “Yerida”

The term “Aliyah” (meaning “Elevation” in Hebrew) refers to the process of Jewish immigration to Israel. The concept originates from the idea of ascending to the Land of Israel, and it carries a positive connotation. Since the 1850s, there have been several distinct “Aliyah waves,” representing major movements of Jews returning to their ancestral homeland, often motivated by a combination of hope for a better future (“push” factor ) and the need to escape persecution ( “pull” factor) describes the process of Israelis emigrating from Israel to other countries. This decision is commonly motivated by economic opportunities, concerns for safety, political disagreements, or simply the desire to experience life abroad. Although “Yerida” (“Descent” in Hebrew ) sometimes carries a negative connotation within Israeli society, it reflects a broader global phenomenon of people seeking better prospects elsewhere.

Economic Migration in the Diaspora and Israel

While much of Jewish migration today is associated with “Aliyah,” it’s important to recognize that Jews continue to move between diaspora countries for economic reasons and other life circumstances. Additionally, many Israelis choose to live abroad, not necessarily as a rejection of Israel, but as a means of exploring economic opportunities and experiences in other parts of the world. Such migration is common in countries with high demographic growth, where a portion of the population seeks new horizons while maintaining ties to their homeland.

Historical Context of Economic Migration

Historically, waves of Jewish migration have often been influenced by both antisemitism and economic hardship. For example, during the Russian pogroms of the 1880s and 1890s, many Jews fled to escape violence, but economic poverty also played a significant role in their decisions. Many of those who moved to Western Europe or the United States were educated individuals from middle-class backgrounds who could afford such a journey, mirroring broader migration trends of the time.

The situation was different in Nazi Germany during the 1930s. Here, Jews fled primarily due to antisemitism, even though the German economy was relatively stable, and many Jews were economically well-off. The combination of economic stability and political uncertainty limited the scale of Jewish emigration, even as circumstances deteriorated.

In the mid-20th century, large waves of Jewish emigration from the Arab world occurred following the establishment of the State of Israel. These movements were facilitated by the Jewish Agency, acting on behalf of the Israeli government, which provided assistance to Jews from diverse social backgrounds to migrate to Israel. This support enabled large-scale immigration, regardless of economic status.

Current Economic Migration Trends

Many Jews will follow the path of other nationals of their countries in economic migrations, but often at an even higher rate due to several factors: the relative ease of emigrating to Israel, the presence of family and friends abroad due to past and recent migrations, a higher-than-average social background, and the welcoming nature of established Jewish communities in many potential destinations which play a role in integration.

Today, Jewish migration patterns are still significantly influenced by economic opportunities, both in Israel and within the diaspora. Migration trends are more gradual in the absence of major security threats. Instead, economic motivations are the primary drivers of Jewish movement globally.

Eastern Europe and Latin America: Jews living in economically challenging regions such as Eastern Europe and Latin America are migrating at varying rates. Recent events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, have accelerated this trend. Many young Russian and Ukrainian Jews left their countries due to fear of conscription or the economic impacts of war. Benefiting from easier bureaucratic pathways to Israel, approximately 70,000 new immigrants arrived in Israel in 2022, with 61% from Russia and 20% from Ukraine. This wave is likely to exacerbate demographic challenges in the Russian Jewish community, which is already dealing with a shrinking and aging population.
Israel: Due to the country’s dynamic economic growth, approximately 0.2% of Israelis emigrate each year, mostly to North America and Western Europe. While some of these emigrants seek economic opportunities, others are driven by a desire to experience life abroad temporarily, with the intention of eventually returning to Israel.
Western Europe: In countries like France and the United Kingdom, some Jews are also emigrating in search of better economic opportunities or due to political and social uncertainty. Many are choosing to move to Israel, the United States, or even Asia, where nations like the United Arab Emirates and Singapore have seen small but growing Jewish communities emerge. The appeal of these destinations is tied to the availability of economic opportunities and the perception of safety and stability.

Economic Drivers vs. Security Concerns

Unlike waves of migration driven by antisemitic violence, economic migration tends to be more gradual and continuous. However, in regions where Jewish communities face a combination of low birth rates, high assimilation rates, and limited economic prospects, the cumulative effect of economic migration can have a significant impact over time. In some cases, these economic movements compound other demographic challenges, accelerating the decline of diaspora communities in certain regions.

While Aliyah remains a powerful symbol of Jewish continuity and connection to Israel, the broader landscape of Jewish migration reflects a diverse set of motivations, often centered on economic prospects, quality of life, and personal growth.

In our calculations, we make several assumptions regarding migration trends for the coming years:

Eastern Europe and Latin America: We assume that Jews in Eastern Europe and Latin America will emigrate at rates of 1% and 0.5% per year, respectively, primarily due to challenging economic conditions. This trend is especially pronounced among young people who have not yet established careers or family lives.
Israel: We assume that Israelis will emigrate at a rate of 0.2% per year for reasons mentioned earlier. Returning Israelis will be counted as part of Diaspora Jewish Aliyah. Returning Olim (i.e. Jews who leave Israel after having made Aliyah ) will be counted as emigrating Israelis.
Western Europe, North America, and Australia: We assume that Jews from these regions will emigrate at very low rates due to stable or strong economies. However, Jews from France may emigrate at slightly higher rates due to relatively low salaries and high taxes in certain sectors, which is a common trend among the broader French population.
Destination of Emigration: On average, we assume that 30% of Jewish emigrants will move to North America, while 70% will move to Israel.

Compared to our earlier discussion on birth rates, assimilation rates, and age distribution, these assumptions are more volatile. It is challenging to predict future economic trends over the next 80 years. While the European Union and the United Kingdom are currently strong, issues like rising debt and stagnating productivity could hinder future opportunities. Similarly, it is difficult to predict whether strong economies like the United States will continue to welcome large numbers of economic migrants or how Israel’s economic trajectory will evolve. Israel’s future depends largely on its integration into the Middle East and potential “peace dividends” from improved security conditions. For the purposes of our analysis, we will assume a moderate scenario: Western Europe remains relatively stable or stagnant, the United States remains very strong, and Israel continues to experience improved socio-economic conditions, despite ongoing challenges.

I would like to point out that, even if these emigration assumptions are somewhat generous, it is unlikely to significantly alter the trajectories of the major Jewish communities. The Israeli and US numbers would be very slightly higher than without migration patterns due to some intake of Jews, but not significantly. In the case of Jewish Israelis leaving the country, it will remain minor in comparison to higher birth rates, and compounded by immigration.

The main effect will be the more precipitous collapse of Jewish communities in difficult countries like Russia, Argentina, South Africa and others, but will not significantly alter the Israeli or American path trajectory.

Part 6— Migration Trends Linked to Antisemitism

When examining Jewish migration trends, it is challenging to fully separate economic migration from migration driven by security concerns. In reality, these motivations often overlap, and our analysis aims to incorporate both factors to provide a forecast of Jewish communities by country for 2050, 2100, and 2150.

Risks Associated with Antisemitism Today

Antisemitism today has multiple sources:

Immigration from unfriendly countries: Many Western countries have experienced increased immigration which, in some cases, has introduced hostility towards Jews. Recent antisemitic attacks in Europe have often involved first- or second-generation immigrants— examples include the 2015 attack at the Kosher supermarket in Vincennes, France, and the murders of Ilan Halimi, Sarah Halimi, and others. These incidents, along with numerous non-lethal antisemitic acts, highlight a significant source of risk. While this situation has not yet reached extreme levels that make daily life unbearable for Jews, hostility towards Israel — especially among Western European youth — has created a negative atmosphere for young Jews, particularly in environments like schools, universities, and workplaces. Nevertheless, ongoing integration into Western societies might gradually mitigate this hostility over time, though risks remain in countries like France, Belgium, the UK, Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Canada, the United States, and Australia.
Left-wing radicalism: Antisemitism has also been fuelled by certain trends in left-wing radicalism, which manifest through hostility towards Israel, nation-states, and traditional values. While Jews are generally liberal, they tend to be more conservative regarding family and tradition, which can also create friction with far-left ideologies. This environment might explain (alongside lower taxes) the recent rise of young American Jews migrating from predominantly left-leaning regions such as New York and California to more right-leaning states like Florida and Texas. Florida, in particular, is projected to surpass New York as the state with the largest Jewish population in the coming decades.
Right-wing radicalism: Traditional antisemitic sentiments from white supremacists — including conspiracy theories about Jewish influence and wealth — continue to exist, compounding the effects of the other sources of antisemitism in various locations. For example, the attack of the Jewish community in Pittsburgh killing 11 in 2018 was committed by a White Supremacist.
Hostility in Developing Countries: In many developing nations, Israel is sometimes viewed as an extension of European colonialism. This perspective is particularly ironic, given that Jews were targeted during the Holocaust for being considered “foreign” to Europe, and are now perceived as “too Western” in the Middle East. However, these countries do not host significant Jewish populations, which makes this source of hostility less relevant to Jewish migration.

Implications for Jewish Migration

Even if migration from countries like France, the UK, or the US accelerates due to rising antisemitism, it will likely contribute to the ongoing decline of Jewish populations in the Diaspora. It may also reduce the inclination of Israeli Jews to emigrate, but it is unlikely to significantly change the overall trajectory. As noted throughout this analysis, the rapid decline in Jewish communities outside of Israel, coupled with significant population growth within Israel, is a highly likely scenario.

Increasingly, most Jewish communities in the Diaspora will be made up of Israeli expatriates. This shift will lead to the disappearance of the traditional “Diaspora phenomenon.” Future Jewish communities abroad, consisting largely of Israeli expatriates and their children, will speak Hebrew, maintain family ties in Israel, and are likely to return to Israel eventually, whether for retirement or other reasons. Consequently, these communities will resemble other expatriate groups more closely than traditional Jewish Diaspora communities. Institutions such as “Jewish schools” may evolve into more secular “Israeli schools,” similar to how French expatriates often send their children to “French lycées.”

This transformation also marks the transition of Jews from a distinctly diasporic people to a more typical nation-state community. Jews living abroad will become less connected to the countries they reside in outside of Israel, behaving more as expatriates than as integrated minorities.

Of course, this trend is contingent on the situation in Israel itself. Challenges such as ongoing conflicts with neighboring countries and unresolved political issues related to the Palestinians could still influence migration patterns.

Potential Outcomes of Increased Antisemitism

In the “increased antisemitism” scenario, we are unlikely to see the complete disappearance of existing Jewish communities, as this outcome seems inevitable regardless of rising hostility. Instead, we may observe a greater proportion of Diaspora Jews emigrating to Israel. However, the numbers will likely remain too small to significantly alter Israel’s overall demographic trajectory. Another potential outcome is the establishment of new Israeli expatriate communities in places that historically lacked Jewish populations. In addition to the United States and Canada, this could include rapidly growing countries closer to Israel, such as the UAE, Singapore, and India. While these scenarios are speculative, what seems certain is that the future of the Jewish people will primarily unfold in Israel in the coming century and beyond.

In summary, the migration trends linked to antisemitism suggest a consolidation of Jewish life within Israel, with diminishing traditional Diaspora communities and the emergence of new Israeli expatriate communities abroad. The future of the Jewish people is thus increasingly tied to the stability, security, and growth of the State of Israel, as, by the end of the century, almost all Jews will be Israeli citizens.